



"Those who say it cannot be done should not interfere with those of us who are doing it"© - S. Hickman

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Against the Grain

## The Informer

### PERSON

This article is being presented, by The Informer, to all people who call themselves "persons" when in a legal setting. The word "person" is not, in legal terms or political terms, what one wants to be. Also, as you will see the term "people" in political terminology is very bad for one who loves freedom. Such as in the phrase "We the People." This will quell and settle, once and for all, all the arguments that are flying around about the term citizen and person, that never is settled. This will also upset people that use the term Pro Se or Propria Persona. I have rung the bell many times since 1990 and still people persist, to their own detriment, to use these terms and tacitly admit they are a "person." This will undoubtedly set some guru's back a piece that preach citizenship of a state is what you want to be. It will also set back some guru's who preach 14th amendment, and that blacks were not persons until the 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment was conceived. The History here will show why their arguments are flawed. Of course this will inflame those guru's to know end. But this is not directed to them but to all you "MEN" and "WOMAN" out there that don't know what to call your selves when addressing any government in a political and legal position. I just gave you the terms to use as you are a physical man or woman reading this, are you not? The artificial you, with a name spelled in all Capital letters, cannot read but has to have a representative. That representative is you, the real live natural MAN or WOMAN and not a "PERSON," is that not correct? Don't know how to answer this, do you? Well don't be dismayed for you will after reading this. The truth is here for all to see. I suspect that Men and Women are so brainwashed by the spin doctors, and guru's that have never studied this, will have a hard time believing this. This comes from a Law book used to teach in Law Schools across the Country. But you will not find it being taught in this modern era, because to do so would put a very bad crimp in government's control over the masses of people calling themselves "persons."

Do not think that after reading this you can go into any court and they will say, my gosh you are right we have no control over you. Just the opposite will be true and they can ask at least three questions that will stop you cold in your tracks and they will walk all over you like flies on a cow patty, because you will stammer and not be able to answer them. At that point they will know that you don't know the correct argument and you lose and BAD CASE LAW will be set. The next MAN that come in with a correct understanding will lose right off the bat because of the bad case law that you have set. I have seen this hundreds of times in the patriot community when someone with a little knowledge is very dangerous to other freedom loving MEN when jumping into water they think is two feet deep only to find it 1000 feet deep and no way to get out.

The material below comes from a 13 volume set of Law books.

**This is from Vol. XIII AMERICAN LAW AND PROCEDURE. JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS.** By James De Witt Andrews LL.B. (Albany Law School), LL.D. (Ruskin University) from La Salle University. I have bolded the footnotes as they may be mixed within some paragraphs, to separate them from the main text so it is not confusing. Starting at the end of section 63;

"Jeremy Bentham, in his remarks in reference to the inexact use of language by Blackstone in pages 47 and 49 of the Commentaries, says: "When leading terms are made to chop and change their several significations, sometimes meaning one thing, sometimes another, at the upshot perhaps nothing, and this in the compass of a paragraph, one may judge what will be the complexion of the whole context" (31).

**64. The legal conception of leading words.** Inasmuch as the word person, man, thing, property, rights, wrongs and actions are leading terms constituting the designation of departments of the corpus juris, it will be impossible to obtain clear conceptions of subjects connected with these words until an understanding is agreed upon as to the sense in which these terms are used. If we arrive at the meaning of these words intended by Blackstone and make the same clear, we will have a better idea of his method and perhaps a better opinion of it, and at the same time will be able to show the distinction between the same words in the Roman, the English and in American law.

Blackstone apparently uses the Roman word persona as synonymous with the English word "person," and the latter word interchangeably with "individual" and "man," whereas he might have avoided all confusion by a

closer adherence to that which he professed to follow.

**65. The word "person" defined.** Gaius says "De Juris divisione" [the divisions of the law] immediately preceding his division of the law; then follows, "De conditione hominum" [meaning the condition or status of men]. In the Institutes "De jura personarum" precedes the expression "all our law relates either to persons, or to things, or to actions,.... The words persona and personae did not have the meaning in the Roman which attaches to homo, the individual, or a man in the English; it had peculiar reference to artificial beings and the condition or status of individuals.(33)

**33. Professor John Austin's view.**—"Many of the modern civilians have narrowed the Import of the term 'person' as meaning a physical or natural person. They define a person thus: 'homo, cure statu sue censideratus; a qauman being, invested with the condition of status., And, In this definition, they use the term status in a restricted sense, as including only those conditions which comprise rights and as excluding conditions which are purely onerous and burthensome, or which consist of duties merely. According to this definition, human beings who have no rights are not persons, but things, being classed with other things which have no rights residing in themselves, but are merely the subjects of rights residing in others. Such, in the Roman law, down to the age of the Antonlnes, was the position of the slave." Austin's Jur., vol 1, 358.

*The signification in Our Jurisprudence ....* The word 'Person,' in its primitive and natural sense, signifies the mask with which actors, who played dramatic pieces in Rome and Greece, covered their heads. These pieces were played in public places. and afterwards in Such vast amphitheatres that it was impossible for a man to make himself heard by all the spectators. Recourse was had to art; the head of each actor was enveloped with a mask, the figure of which represented the Part he was to play, and it was so contrived that the opening for the emission of his voice made the sounds clearer and more resounding, vox personabat, when the name persona was given to the instrument or mask which facilitated the resounding of his voice. The name persona was afterwards applied to the part itself which the actor had undertaken to play, because the face of the mask was adapted to the age and character of him who was considered as speaking, and sometimes it was his own portrait. It is in this last sense of personage, or of the part which an individual plays, that the word persona is employed in jurisprudence, in opposition to the word man, homo. When we speak of a person, we only consider the state of the man, the part he plays in society, abstractly, without considering the individual".

1 Bouvier's Institutes, note 1.

**Austin's Jur., 362.**

**See 4 Harv. Law Rev., 101,**

**Austin's Jur., 363.**

The word "homo" corresponds to the English word "man," and, as the Romans expressed it, "unus homo sustinet plures personas;" i.e., one man has many persons, or sustains many status, or many different conditions **(34)**

**AUSTINS JUR., 362)**

Austin says: "The term 'person' has two meanings, which must be carefully distinguished. It denotes a man or human being; or it signifies some condition borne by a man (35 See Harvard Law Revues 101). A person (as meaning a man) is one or individual, but a single or individual person (meaning a man) may sustain a number of persons (meaning condition or status)" **(36 Austins Jur., 363).**

Notice that this meaning is not so broad as that given by Ortolan. It does not include artificial persons. Again, he says: "As throwing light on the celebrated distinction between jus rerum and jus personarum, phrases which have been translated so absurdly by Blackstone and others,--rights of persons and rights of things, jus personarum did not mean law of persons, or rights of persons, but law of status, or condition. A person is here not a physical or individual person, but the status or condition with which he is invested. It is a remarkable confirmation of this that Gaius, in the margin purporting to give the title or heading of this part of the law, has entitled it thus: De conditione hominum; and Theophilus, in translating the Institutes of Justinian from Latin into Greek, has translated jus personarum . . . diviso personarum; understanding evidently by persona . . . not an individual or physical person, but the status, condition or character borne by physical persons. This distinctly shows the meaning of the phrase jus per sonarurn, which has been involved in impenetrable obscurity by Blackstone and Hale. The law of persons is the law of status or condition; the law of things is the law of rights and obligations considered in a general manner, or as distinguished from these peculiar collections of rights and obligations which are styled conditions and considered apart.

A moment's reflection enables one to see that man and person cannot be synonymous, for there cannot be an artificial man, though there are artificial persons. Thus the conclusion is easily reached that the law itself often creates an entity or a being which is called a person; the law cannot create an artificial man, but it can and frequently does invest him with artificial attributes; this is personality, which we see and by which we are affected.

The law does not distinguish between men except by their personality, as king or magistrate, or as parent or husband or wife, etc. While the idea may be difficult for the tyro to grasp, the personality, i.e., this condition or status of a many is entirely the creation of the law. By nature all men are created free and equal, i.e., of equal rank, equal rights; but the law does not look upon all men as equal, though in the law of the United States all men have equal civil rights (39).

The question is asked, Who is that man? The reply would be, that is the king or lord so and so, or the chief justice or the president or governor. But what is the name of this personage? The name indicates the man, the title, rank or legal standing of the person.

The word "persons" denoted certain conditions of rank or status with which a man was clothed by law. To adopt the language of the same author, "the term 'person,' as denoting a condition or status, is therefore equivalent to character (40). It signified, originally, a mask worn by a player, and distinguished the character which he represented from the other characters in the play. From the mask which expressed the character, it was extended to the character itself. From characters represented by players, or from dramatic characters, it was further extended by a metaphor to conditions or as status. For men, as subjects of law, are distinguished conditions, just as players, perform by their respective conditions, just as players, performing a play are distinguished by the several persons which they respectively enact or sustain" (41). As we shall see, the word had a still broader meaning.

"A slave," says Holland, "having, as such, neither rights or liabilities, had in Roman law, strictly speaking, no 'status,' 'caput,' or 'persona.' On the day of his manumission, says Modestinus, 'incipit stature habere.' Before manumission, as we read in the Institutes, 'nullum caput habuit'" (42).

The following is the explanation given by Mr. Sandars in his translation of the Institutes: "The word persona had, in the usage of the Roman law, a different meaning from that which we ordinarily attach to the word 'person.' Whoever or whatever was capable of having, and being subject to, rights, was a persona. All men possessing a reasonable will would naturally be personae; but not all those who were, physically speaking, men, were personae. Slaves, for instance, were not in a position to exercise their reason and will, and the law, therefore refused to treat them as personae."

"On the other hand, many personae had no physical existence. The law clothed certain abstract conceptions with an existence, and attached to them the capability of having and being subject to rights. The law, for instance, spoke of the state as a persona. It was treated as being capable of having the rights and of being

**39 See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 368.**

**40 Hale nowhere speaks of status, but uses the term "character" or "capacity." See note 60. below.** subject to them. These rights really belonged to the men who composed the state, and they flowed from the constitution and position of associated individuals. But, in the theory and language of law, the rights of the whole community were referred to the state, to an abstract conception interposed between these rights and the individual members of society. So, a corporation, or an ecclesiastical institution, was a persona, quite apart from the individual personae who formed the one and administered the other. Even the fiscus, or the imperial treasury, as being the symbol of the abstract conception of the emperor's claims, was spoken of as a persona. The technical term for the position of an individual regarded as a legal person was status" (44).

Ortolan's explanation of personality.(45) The substance of the above was undoubtedly taken from Ortolan's treatment of the subject as given in his History of the Roman Law, which is submitted because it is clear and concise:

"The word 'person' (persona) does not in the language of the law, as in ordinary language, designate the physical man. This word in law has two acceptations: In the first, it is every being considered as capable of having or owing rights, of being the active or passive subjects of rights.

"We say every being, for men are not alone comprised therein. In fact, law by its power of abstraction creates persons, as we shall see that it creates things, which do not exist in nature.

Thus, it erects into persons the state, cities, communities, charitable or other institutions, even purely material objects, such as the fiscus, or inheritance in abeyance, because it makes of them beings capable of having or owing rights. In the inverse sense, every man in Roman law is not a person. For example, slaves were considered as the property of the master, especially under the rigorous system of primitive legislation, because they are the object and not the subject of law. This, however, did not prevent the Romans from including them in another sense in the class of persons.

"We shall therefore have to discriminate between and to study two classes of person: physical or natural persons, for which we find no distinctive denomination in Roman jurisprudence except the expressions taken from Ulpian, singularis persona; that is to say, (46) the man-person; and abstract persons, which are fictitious and which have no existence except in law; that is to say, those which are purely legal conceptions or creations.

"In another sense, very frequently employed, the word 'person' designates each character man is called upon to play on the judicial stage; that is to say, each quality which gives him certain rights or certain obligations-for instance, the person of 43 Slaves were not persons in the United States until after the abolition of slavery

**1 Hammond's Bjk. 334, note.**

**44 Sandars' Justinian, Introduction, P. 26.**

**45 Ortolan's History of the Roman Law is among the best. It is, unfortunately, not easily obtained.** father; of son as subject to his father; of husband or guardian. In this sense the same man can have several

personae at the same time. The last two paragraphs embrace all that Austin gives us in the quotation given above.

From what we have seen, the following conclusion may be drawn: The words persona and status were not synonymous, though very nearly so. The word "person" had two meanings:

First. Every being, artificial or natural, capable of having or owing rights.  
Second. The characters, capacities, qualities or positions which the law ascribed to certain men as individuals—that is, rank, condition, capacity-status.

The technical term for the second meaning, namely, the position, quality, character which a man bears, is status. Status is not so broad as person, but always related to physical men.

A slave had no rights, no rank, no standing, no capacity, and consequently no status. This applies, of course, only to the earlier days of Roman law, for subsequently slaves were given a standing as men.

"In the earlier days of Roman law," says Sandara "no one would have conceived this to be unnatural" (48). In the days of Gaius, it seems, slaves are treated as persons, for he says: "Persons are freemen or slaves" (49).

In England all men were persons, and were divided into certain classes or ranks by virtue of which they had especial characters, capacities, rights, privileges and immunities; for instance, the right of magistracy' as king, as lord, etc. These were artificial. In human societies men have certain standing, position, capacity, according as they are sovereign or subjects, parents and children, husband and wife, or citizens.

We have seen something of the etymology of the word, also its meaning and application as used in the Roman law. We know that the word "person" is a familiar one in English literature, both in England and America. We are endeavoring to ascertain whether in the English language we have a right to oppose persons to things for the Purpose of classification of rules of law, and if thereby we convey intelligent ideas.

We know that all laws emanate from persons and also that they operate against or upon persons(50); that is, all law certainly from laws, and that the principle of classification adopted is the difference in the objects to which the rules relate.

There can be found in the Commentaries of Blackstone no definition of the word person, nor any explanation of the meaning

**46 Does not this equal "individuals?" See 10 Harvard Law Rev., 101.**

**47 Ortholan's History of Roman Law, 567-68.**

**48 Sandals' Justinian, Int., 27; Austin's Jur., lect. 12, P.358 49 Galus, 1-9; Austin's Jur., 358.**

addresses persons. So of rights. We know that rights belong to persons, and that in that sense there cannot be the rights of things. It should be borne in mind that we are endeavoring to classify the body of laws, and not the rights which are resultant intended to be ascribed to the word "person," and the word is there used indiscriminately in the popular and legal sense, interchangeably with "man" and "individual," and also to designate artificial beings capable of having rights; and there is not the slightest hint that in using the Roman expressions there is any change intended from the Roman idea of the word "person," though he does treat under the rights of persons what he styles absolute rights, which would be called "things" in Roman law.

**§ 66. Scope of the word "thing."** Of things (51), which is the subject of the second book, Blackstone says: "The objects of your inquiry in this second book will be the jura rerum, or those rights which a man may acquire in and to such external things as are unconnected with his person." Why not say unconnected with him, himself? These are what the writers in natural law style the "rights of dominion or property." This is the only definition given of the words "property" 'or "thing;" that is, the jura rerum equals those rights which a man may acquire in and to external things. Otherwise put, the rights of things are rights which a man may acquire in and to things unconnected with his person; and these are what writers in natural law style property; yet in the treatment of this subject the learned commentator treats the subject of contracts, the main feature of which is its obligation, or, in other words, the power which the law affords one person of enforcing it by . . . .

WE now go further into the book and this is what it has to say about you people who want so much to be a part of the body politic and want the Constitution as your God and then claim that you are free from the tether of government. IT AIN'T GONNA HAPPEN AND YOU HAVE BEEN SUCKERED IN HOOK, LINE AND SINKER WHEN CLAIMING SO AND ARE COMPLETELY DOMINATED BY THEM.

**50. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 332; 92' Id. 554; United States v. Harris, 106 id. 629; Civil Rights Cases, 109 id. 3. A state may in a sense fall under the designation, and laws be directed against states; but as the state acts by individuals, in the same manner it is operated upon through individuals.**

**51. Observe the word "chose," which will be explained hereafter. Its meaning has an important bearing on the modified meaning of both "person" and "things." Vol. XII 12**

## CHAPTER VIII THE PEOPLE.

**§ 104. The people: Identity.** In the United States the people are brought on the stage as an acting political

entity, acting, it is true, always through representatives. As expressed by Wilson, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence: "In free states the people form an artificial person or body politic, the highest and noblest that can be known" (1 Wilson's Works).

By "the people" of a state is meant all of the (members) which compose that state and are integral parts of it, together making a body politic (2 Penhollow v Doane, 3 Dall. 55, 93).

[PEOPLE, THIS IS A STRAIGHT OUT ADMIRALTY CASE IN CASE YOU DIDN'T KNOW AS IT DEALT WITH LAW MERCHANTS, YOU KNOW THEM AS CORPORATE ENTITIES]

The people as a corporate unit form an artificial person or body politic; thus constituted they form a moral person". "It is this person we call a state. (4 1 Wilson's Works 321-325; 2 Wilson's Works 321)" "There is no distinction between the people and the state" (5 Penhollow v Doane, 3 Dall 93).

It must not be forgotten that, in using the expression "the people," there is a distinction between the population of the nation, as individuals, and the same population organized under a constitution. By "the people," in this connection, we intend a body politic, a corporate unity. Because of the quality of singleness we may properly use the pronoun "it," though, this is not usual. It is hard for the citizen to lose sight of the individuals in the body; but correctly viewed, as drops of water lose their forms as drops when they mingle with the whole and become not drops, but one body, even so the citizen in his political capacity loses the civil capacity of an individual when viewed as a part of that great unit "the people."

It is the whole mass, and not a majority of the individuals composing it, which constitutes the people, and the people are to be regarded, not as an unorganized mob, but as a corporate unity composing a society (6). There are dicta to the effect that the people, when spoken of in the political sense, means only those persons having the right to vote, that is, the electors; and it is at the same time said that in the electors is vested the sovereignty (7). Thus stated, the idea does not, as we shall see, properly obtain, and is contrary to the principles of American institutions (8). Voters are but parts of the machinery of government (9). In the constitution "the people, is sometimes used to indicate persons or individuals. So in all provisions in reference to unreasonable seizures and searches. In such provision it is identical with the use in Blackstone.

**6. Jameson, Const. Con. (4<sup>th</sup> ed.), pp. q8, 19, notes: Von Holst's Con. Law, 48, 49; Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dall. 92.**

"A distinction was taken at the bar between a state and the people of the state. It is a distinction I am not capable of comprehending. By a state forming a republic (speaking of it as a moral person), I do not mean the legislature of the state, the executive of the state, or the judiciary, but all the citizens who compose the state, and are, if I may so express myself, integral parts of it; all together forming a body politic. The great distinction between monarchies and republics (at least our republic) in general is, that in the former the monarch is considered as the sovereign, and each individual of his nation as a subject to him, though in some countries with many important special limitations. This, I say, is generally the ease, for it has not been so universally. But in a republic, all the citizens as such, are equal, and no citizen can rightfully exercise any authority over another but in virtue of a power constitutionally given by the whole community, and such authority, when exercised, is in effect an act of the whole community, which forms such body politic. In such governments, therefore, the sovereignty resides in the great body of the people, but it resides in them not as so many distinct individuals, but in their political capacity only. Thus A., B., C., and D. are citizens of Pennsylvania, and as such, together with all the citizens of Pennsylvania, share in the sovereignty of the state. Suppose a state to consist exactly of the number of 100,000 citizens, and it were practicable for them all to assemble at one time and in one place, and that 99,999 did actually assemble. The state would not be in fact assembled. Why? Because the state in fact is composed of all the citizens, not of a part only, however large the part may be, and one is wanting." Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dall. 93.

**7. Cooley's Const. Lira. 40, citing Blair v. Rldgely, 41 Mo. 63; 97 Am:Dec. 248**

**.8. Wilson's Works, App'x A, IX 566; McOrary on Elections (4<sup>th</sup> ed.), sec 13.**

**9. State v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 498.**

**§105. Capacity. Power. Sovereignty.** We may now examine the powers of the people, and in the course of this examination but little time need be spent upon theory or metaphysical discussion of what ought to be the law governing the matter, but will, as far as possible, be conferred to the practical, visible facts. The discussion of the capacities of that person we term "the people" necessarily involves the discussion of What is termed sovereignty. Let no one suppose that this question is an impracticable one and that it has no further.

I END THIS SECTION HERE --GO TO THE NEXT SECTION 132 AND-- STARTING AT THE END OF THE PAGE WHICH CONTAINS WHAT I WANT YOU TO SEE.

"To fully appreciate the idea of sovereignty and the federal court has appellate jurisdiction of a suit by a state against an individual (13). The palpable injustice of the rule has led to several ingenious devices to avoid its application (14), such for example as the assignment of the cause of action to a person competent to sue, (e.g. a state), which, however, must be a real assignment (15).

The sufficient reason for the rule is found in the expression, "it is the written law"; the motive for it throws no light on its application (16).

### § 133. An individual contracts with a state at his peril.

It is now well settled that there is no judicial remedy in favor of an individual against a state to compel the performance of a contract (17), though it is settled that a state can pass no law impairing the obligation of a contract once made (18). The only security for state loans rests on the plighted faith of the state as a political community; that is, upon the same basis as contracts with independent governments (19). States are not, like nations, independent of each other, and are not permitted to allow the use of state names for the purpose of enforcing claims really owned by individuals.

As to torts and injuries: It is no answer to a tort or an active infringement of a right or a threatened injury that the action was taken or is proceeding under supposed official duty or by virtue of official power: such cases are not *damnum absque injuria*.

There you have it people. I did not highlight anything in the main text that was not already there or italicized. This is devastating against the Government of State and Federal. Do you want to find out how corrupt "your" government is? Well after this hits the net the Government will pull from the shelves of all the libraries and law schools where some of these volumes might be, just as Hitler did to the German people so they would not learn the truth. What makes you think this country's slime balls, called government officials and the lawyers that run this country,--count the number of executive and legislative persons there are that are lawyers,-- are any different? They are not. In those countries it was brutality, here it is legality with words, but the results are the same, -- complete control of the Men and Women. But of late it has become apparent that brutality is showing its ugly head starting with IRS, ATF and DEA abuse of the people under the directives of upper level "persons" that legally can't throw enough men and women in jail fast enough.

I'll tell you that the law professors know this and they taught it. They can't teach it now, by government dictate. Lawyers are only taught what the establishment wants taught. The legal profession has so much moral turpitude oozing from their pores that compared to a chicken house that hasn't been cleaned in a month, on a 100 degree day, make it smell like a bed of roses.

As Shakespeare said very eloquently, "The first thing we do is hang all the lawyers." Yes, and Virginia Colony was correct back in the 1700's that the practice of lawyering was an offense punishable by death. They sure dropped the ball on that one.

So the problem at hand is that every statute is written with the term "person" in mind. Why, you ask? Well as I quoted in my book *The New History of America*, the case of *Cruden v Neale*, where the court states a principle of natural law so clear that it cannot be twisted by any lawyer, that man is only bound by the laws of nature. Here is what the court stated;

"When a change of government takes place, from a monarchical to a republican government, the old form is dissolved. Those who lived under it, and did not choose to become members of the new, had a right to refuse their allegiance to it, and to retire elsewhere. By being a part of the society subject to the old government, they had not entered into any engagement to become subject to any new form the majority might think proper to adopt. That the majority shall prevail is a rule posterior to the formation of government, and results from it. It is not a rule binding upon mankind in their natural state. There, every man is independent of all laws, except those prescribed by nature. He is not bound by any institutions formed by his fellowmen without his consent." **CRUDEN v. NEALE, 2 N.C. 338 (1796) 2 S.E. 70.** Emphasis added.

By this very principle espoused by the court you cannot be made to "retire elsewhere" because, if anything, you retire from the corporate STATE and live upon the land of the Lord in the geographical place called North Carolina rather than the State of North Carolina. Go back and look at the Hamilton case where they said that you " \* \* shall take an oath of abjuration and allegiance, or depart out of the State." Let them keep their corporate State; depart out of it. Isn't that what the Bible tells you "Come out of her?" What do you need it for? To continually be robbed by legal plunder? Not that they are going to stop if you do, because maybe, just maybe, the masses will wake up and want out also, thereby destroying the State's power over you.

You see, the whole game is to control you by making you, the man, into a artificial entity called a "person." In ordinary street language you can use the term person. But the minute you step into ANY legal arena you CANNOT use the term "person." For to do so the other artificial person, the State, can come after another artificial character. As the court stated above **"man" is not bound by other men's laws unless he consents. You consent when you answer to any statute containing any reference to person.** The clever trick is that the statute 26 USC 7701(a) of the IRC is the definition part and it says "person" means; an individual, partnership, corporation, association. Notice that all terms defining the word "person are corporate fictions. BUT, you say, individual is not a corporate fiction because am I not an individual? Yes you are in average common street terms, but in the legal arena **"individual is corporate or artificial by legal definition, because "individual," in and of itself is defining an artificial thing as a "person."** So how can it be a natural man? It goes against all

reason and logic. The IRC Code Statute only pertains to man, who as stated above by the Professor, takes on the artificial character and becomes a "person" by legal definition. Therefore he is subject to all the legal disabilities that come with the term person and that means being subject to all the laws of the parent corporation. The parent corporation is the United States, the State is the artificial child and you are the artificial grand child. That is the best way to describe it so you can start to equate terms and meanings.

In Anderson's Business law on the Uniform Commercial Code, I think around the sixth edition, it states that when a statute refers to artificial beings, natural people are not to be included. So, 26 USC 7701 (a) (1) uses all artificial characters to describe the artificial "person" and individual. By all reason and logic it has to be an artificial term. Just like a third grade reader shows 5 pictures and asks which one does not belong. The pictures are, a baseball, a bat, a base, a glove and a football uniform. You circle the football uniform as not fitting the idea, but the football clothes is a uniform, the same as baseball clothes is a uniform. Only one uniform fits the scheme while the other is left out, but both are uniforms. The same as individual. It is a "leading word" as the professor stated and has to be further defined the same as individual or person has to be defined. Did not the professor state the term individual and person are one in the same? Did he not also state that it is well settled in law that "person" is always an artificial person? Refresh your memory by finding that part of his statement.

The Informer



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